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In order to keep the competitive advantages in today‘s global business market, it is 
critical for the companies to establish an effective engineering collaboration and protect 
the intellectual properties of the original manufacturer companies. The purpose of this 
thesis is to develop the modularization method introduced by Li (2007), in order to 
protect intellectual property from being shared by suppliers or other manufacturers that 
attempt to do reverse engineering in collaborative design. This thesis uses this introduced 
Function-Parameter matrix which represents the dependency relationships between 
shared and protected (IP) design parameters, in order to group and isolate all the 
intellectual property information. This modularization includes three phases of clustering 
that matches hierarchical clustering rules. Due to this clustering, tracking the protected 
parameters via inferences and selecting one set of low risk parameters for sharing with 
suppliers will be more effective while this method mitigates the risk of information 
leakage for intellectual property. Based on a matrix-based modular structure, two 
formulations are proposed to estimate the leakage risk of protected parameters due to the 
disclosure of shared parameters to suppliers and potential inferences.  At the end, the DC 
motor and the relief valve system are used to examine the proposed modularization and 
measurement methods. 
Keywords: Collaborative design, intellectual property, cluster analysis, modularization, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
With globalization, companies need to focus on their competitive advantages in order to 
remain in the competitive markets. One competitive advantage is to shorten time-to-
market via collaborative design with suppliers (Ma et al. 2009). In order to achieve this 
objective, companies need to share some of their design information during the 
collaboration. Wang et al. (2006) define the collaborative design as the process where all 
the stakeholders are one part of design decision-making process and all the product 
information of stakeholders can be shared across the boundaries of companies through 
internet. In collaborative design, the suppliers and the other manufacturers design the 
components with their own knowledge and independent from the original knowledge of 
the original manufacturer (OM) (Mun et al. 2009). However, it is important for OM to 
keep some vital information protected, which are considered as the intellectual properties 
(IP) of the company. In this thesis, we call intellectual properties as protected parameters 
or functions which companies try to protect them. Moreover, the design data which 
companies share with the other parties in collaborative design are called shared 
parameters and shared functions. In our assumptions, an inference or interaction happens 
when some protected or non-protected parameters inferred from some shared parameters 
due to some inherent relationships between design functions and parameters. It is 
assumed that the original manufacturers design and sell the final product for profits, and 
the suppliers receive the orders from the original manufacturers for producing 
component(s) of the final product. 
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In the phase of product design, the OM and the other suppliers and manufacturers need to 
share some information about design components for the other parties to be able to design 
their own design components (Mun et al. 2009). Due to the nature of collaborative 
design, many researches focused on information protection methods in order to minimize 
the risk of information leakage in collaborative design such as access control, 
generalization, simplification (Wang et al. 2006, Mun et al. 2009, Zhang et al. 2004).   
These methods were used to control the information sharing of design components 
between different parties. Cera et al. (2006) defined information protection as creating 
―need to know‖ protections on sensitive and critical information. In product design, 
information protection methods cannot completely prevent leaking of design information 
for the other parties but these methods can just reduce the risk of leaking of sensitive 
information. For example, in designing a cell phone, one may need to know the exact 
shape of the device in order to design GPS for the cell phone but not the information 
about operating system or application applied in the cell phone being created by another 
parties. In this case, OM companies try to outsource the information which each designer 
needs for doing his own part and keep the other information protected. Sometimes, due to 
the inherent relationships between design functions of one product, some common design 
elements will be needed for different suppliers. Yet, Zhang et al. (2011,a) represented 
that the information leakage can take place due to some inferences that are not 
intellectual properties of companies but it can lead to disclosing these information. Then, 
the decision about which pieces of information should be shared for collaboration is not 
obvious.  This thesis is intended to address this issue based on the inference notion by 
Zhang et al. (2011a). 
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In order to mitigate the risk of information leakage and select one secure set of 
parameters for sharing, we can group or isolate the protected and non-protected 
parameters. Clustering and grouping lead to the decomposition and allocation of product 
design parameters that have an important affect on controlling the risk of inferences and 
mitigating the risk of information leakage (Zhang et al. 2011a). One of the applications of 
clustering is in DSM (design structure matrix) and RM (rectangular matrix). Design 
Structure Matrix was proposed by Steward in 1981 and is a matrix which shows the 
relations and information flows between elements of one type. But RM represents the 
dependency among two types of elements. After using DSM/RM, different clustering 
method can be used to identify the interdependent groups of tasks or system elements. 
There is no universal and best algorithm for choosing the best clustering method and it 
totally depends on research objectives (Li 2007).  
1.2. Thesis objectives and organization 
In collaborative design, companies need to share some design information with the other 
participating companies in order to make the product design more effective and 
productive. However, the original manufacturer needs to protect some design information 
in order to prevent reverse engineering. In this thesis we develop a clustering method 
introduced by Li (2007) that can isolate and group the IP-sensitive parameters in few 
modules. By this modularization, we can separate all confidential parameters from non-
confidential information. However there are some inferences that connect the modules 
which contain IP-sensitive parameters to the modules with non-IP sensitive information. 
In this case, we can control these kinds of interactions in order to mitigate the IP-sensitive 
information leakage. Furthermore, the quantitative approach is provided to measure and 
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estimate the risk of information sharing of each module in disclosing the IP-sensitive 
parameters which caused by potential inferences. Then we can analyze the results of this 
measurement to decide which set of information can be shared with the other suppliers 
and manufacturers with low risk of information leakage. The contribution of this thesis is 
in two-fold. First, we use the modularization method in order to protect the critical 
information and intellectual properties of original manufacturer using function-parameter 
(FP) matrix and apply the target coefficient (it has been discussed in Chapter 4) to 
address the need of clustering IP-sensitive parameters. Secondly, due to the use of the 
modular matrix, the risk estimation of information leakage which caused by potential 
inferences (to be discussed in Chapter 5) is also newly derived for the application of 
secure collaborative design.  More justifications can be found in subsequent sections 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 will review the related works.  
Chapter 3 will introduce a matrix-based modeling for secure parametric design, with the 
characterization of security-specific information.  Chapter 4 will describe one clustering 
method for modularization and then develop this method for clustering IP-sensitive 
parameters.  Based on the modular structure, Chapter 5 will propose two different 
measures to estimate the risk of information leakage.  Chapter 6 will present two case 
studies by applying our method to relief valve and DC motor systems.  In conclusions 
and future works chapter (i.e. Chapter 7) we summarize the contributions of this thesis 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Dependency modeling and information leakage 
Sharing design information can have both positive and negative effects for original 
manufacturers (OM) in supply chain. Obviously, sharing the informtion with suppliers 
and other manufacturers lead to reduced costs and more efficient products (Zhang et al. 
2011a). In contrast, sharing some confidentional infromation which are intellectual 
properties for companies in collaborative design, may lead in loosing the competitive 
edge for companies and information leakage. In order to summarize all the risks of 
information leakage in supply chain, Dye and Sridhar (2003), represented the negative 
effects of using outside consulting for the new defined project on information leakage 
that lead to reduced value of the project. 
Referring to Mun et al. (2009), intellectual property is a concept that can be defined 
considering the positions of participating companies in collaborative design, i.e., OM and 
suppliers. Intellectual properties can specify the competitive advantages of each 
company. One issue of Computers in Industry (2012, vol.63) discusses secure 
collaboration in design and supply chain management (Zeng et al. 2012a). Therefore, in 
order to avoid losing the competitive advantages, the original manufacturer needs to be 
careful about sharing its intellectual property with the other collaborating companies 
during the product design process. On the other hand, the nature of collaborative design 
needs this information sharing and collaboration. Recently, Zeng et al. (2012b) have done 
a comprehensive literature review for secure collaboration in the global design and 
supply chain environment. In this paper they use EBD methodology in order to collect, 
organize, and analyze the literature by viewing literature review as a design problem. 
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Zhang et al. (2011a) discussed, information leakage in supply chain can occur in two 
different ways: 1- Direct leakage of information. 2- Information leakage that are placed 
via inferences. In this thesis we focus on both ways of information leakage and represent 
the critical role of inferences in information leakage by doing modularization, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 4.  
2.1.1. Secure collaboration in collaborative design 
As computer-aided design (CAD) becomes popular in engineering design, it is often used 
to store and transmit the design information in design collaboration. Mun et al. (2009) 
discussed in his research that in detail design of one product, all participating companies 
in collaborative design, need to access CAD data of the other parties due the inherent 
relationships between the design components. However, disclosing CAD data to another 
party in collaborative design may lead in disclosing the design components that include 
intellectual properties of a collaborating company. Nowadays, sharing information and 
collaborating with the other companies are critical for companies to survive in the 
competitive market. Due to this fact, the secured and effective sharing of design 
information is a vital concept in collaborative design. 
In order to protect the information, some papers focused on the factors and conditions 
that lead to information leakage and proposed the methods to reduce them. Some 
researchers proposed to conceal the sensitive data or their sources and un-hide the 
summary measures like the mean and the variance (Zhang and Li 2006.) Li and Atallah 
(2006) used linear programming methods to solve supply chain problems by considering 
security. Then, Deitos et al. (2009) proposed a probability-based technique to improve 
overall practical performance of linear programming methods which was used to model 
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the collaborative problem. In order to mitigate the risk of information leakage in supply 
chain, Zhang et al. (2010) focused on the optimal supplier selection methods. In this 
thesis, we apply modularization in FP matrix which will be discussed in Chapter 4 in 
order to group the protected parameters and minimize the risk of information leakage. 
Since IP protection is the main goal of information leakage protection methods, we 
review some important approaches in the literature for securing the IP information. Mun 
et al. (2009) divided the current approaches for securing the intellectual property of a 
company in product design collaboration into three categories: access control methods, 
model simplification and watermarking. 
2.1.2. Access control methods for information protection 
In the literature, access control is the most common method proposed to control the 
sharing of information especially CAD information and IP protection. In access control 
method, everyone has specific authorization to have access to the product information. 
Access control method has been used to protect sharing of information in different fields 
(Sun and Wang 2011). Carminati et al. (2011) used access control method for emergency 
management and Sun and Wang (2011) applied this method for providing information 
security in e-healthcare services. However, one of the most common usages of access 
control method is in protecting CAD information in collaborative design. 
Wang et al. (2006) defined three major access control methods as: 1- discretionary access 
control; 2- mandatory access control; 3- role-based access control. In the first method, the 
access is defined based on the person who wants to have access to data but for the second 
method (i.e. mandatory access control) each data has specific security level and each user 
has defined security clearances, and users can only have access to data for which they are 
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clear. However, role-based access control method has received most attention in the 
domain of collaborative design. Basically, a role is a concept that connects job functions 
and users, and it can be used to derive the policy for information security (Sandhu et al. 
1996).   
Cera et al. (2004) applied role-based access control to information protection in design 
collaboration. This system was extended to a Scheduled Role-Based Distributed Data 
Access Control by Wang et al. (2006) that allowed for fine-grained data access control 
for the security of both sides of customers and servers. He believed that the current access 
control cannot be directly applied in CAD models due to their pure concentration on the 
appearance of 3D models. Based on decision making concept, Zheng et al (2012) also 
proposed a trust-based privacy authorization model which made the fine-grained 
authorization decision. Cera et al. (2006) developed role-based viewing through 
integration of multi-resolution geometry and security models by adding the design roles. 
In this research they focused on information assurance as a critical technique to protect 
intellectual property in collaborative design.  
2.1.3. The other methods for information protection in collaborative design 
Although many researches in the collaborative design domain have been devoted to the 
access control methods, some researchers believed that these methods are not able to 
address the formalization of a process in order to specify design parameters in a way 
which is more applicable (Mun et al. 2009). According to this problem in access control 
methods, simplification model was considered as a method which provided design model 
considering the accessibility of data for users with different levels of detail (LOD). 
However, due to the inherent simplification of this method, some critical design 
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information was deformed during the simplification process which would make problems 
in product design collaboration. In fact, this method had problems in considering the 
inferences between different parts of design components (Mun et al. 2009). 
Unlike the simplification model, watermarking is a method which keeps the original form 
of design data (Benedens 1999). As Mun et al. (2009) represented, due to the frequent 
changing of data in design process, watermarking method cannot be applied in product 
design collaboration. 
Suppression is the other method of controlling the security of information in supply chain 
(Zhang et al. 2011a). In this method, all confidential and sensitive data will be removed 
from data sets and documents and the other information can be released. In the domain of 
collaborative design, this method can be applied for CAD data which contain intellectual 
property when they exchange between different parties. 
Mun et al. (2009) believed none of the above introduced methods could work effectively 
in securing CAD data in product design collaboration. These methods cannot specify the 
relationships between design components and their interfaces. He proposed a method to 
share a skeleton model among collaborating companies. By using this method, the 
participating companies receive the required information for doing detailed design while 
the security of the intellectual properties of the original manufacturers will be considered, 
simultaneously. 
Some other proposed dependency models were used in the literature. Zanetti et al. (2008) 
proposed a framework in order to explain the correlations between the sensitive 
information and serial–level data. Then Rojas-Arciniegas and Kim (2012) proposed the 
matrix-based approach that considers information security in determining optimal 
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product architecture and component sharing decisions. He used DSM clustering using 
genetic algorithms in order to model the relationships between components. Kim et al. 
(2012) suggested a data model for the design template in order to specify product design 
data transmitted between a manufacturer and a design checking service provider by 
extending the skeleton model. In this thesis we use modularized FP matrix as our 
dependency model in order to consider the dependency between design parameters and 
their interfaces. 
2.1.4. Information leakage and inferences 
Although all the mentioned methods help to mitigate the risk of information leakage, but 
these methods are not able to control the effect of inferences correctly and they cannot 
evaluate the risk of information leakage caused by potential inferences and selected 
shared parameters. 
Regarding this problem, some researchers have developed some methods respect to 
inferences and the following risk that will be concluded from the inferences besides using 
dependency models. Zhang et al. (2011a) represented the effect of inferences in 
information leakage by introducing a conceptual model (logical dependency graph) as the 
dependency model between design components and proposed quantitative method in 
order to evaluate the risk of information leakage respect to some shared information. In 
this research, they tried to answer to two questions in order to mitigate the risk of 
information leakage via inferences: ―What inferences are possible, and what is the risk of 
information leakage caused by such inferences?‖. They have also claimed that no 
satisfactory answers had been provided in other researches. Then, Deng et al. (2012) used 
DSM model in order to generate suitable product decomposition regarding IP protection 
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and manufacturing cost reduction issues considering different types of interactions and 
used the decomposition for an optimal supplier selection to mitigate the leakage risk of 
confidential information caused by inferences and minimize the manufacturing cost in the 
process. 
The dependency model using in our thesis is function-parameter matrix based on three 
steps of hierarchical clustering. We also introduce modularization considering inferences 
which will be discussed in Chapter 4, in order to cover the questions discussed by Zhang 
et al. (2011a). 
2.2. Security measures 
In order to improve the process of collaborative design, different criteria and measures 
are defined in different papers. Yin et al. (2008) proposed 3-dimentional performance 
measurement model based on design dynamics, time and role-based performance 
measurement. This model helps the project managers to minimize the collaboration risks. 
Then, Dain et al. (2010) focused on the measures to evaluate the performance of each 
supplier during different stages of collaborative design.  
During the process of designing a product in collaborative design, we should protect the 
intellectual property of original manufacturer from the other parties by security measures. 
However, these security measures should not be considered as a barrier for doing 
collaboration (Mun et al. 2009). Security measures are different based on the dependency 
models using in collaborative design. But, the goal of all security measures is to minimize   
the risk of information leakage in the whole product design process. In the literature, 
there are some different measures in order to evaluate the role of proposed models for 
secure collaboration.  
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Some researchers just compare the result of their experiences when they apply security in 
their model in order to evaluate the effectiveness of their proposed method in protecting 
the critical information. For instance, Cera et al. (2006) proposed Hierarchical Role-
Based Viewing, for multilevel information security in collaborative 3D assembly design. 
By applying this method for computer mouse assembly, the costs and risks of 
collaboration reduced. Rojas-Arciniegas and Kim (2012) proposed a model with security 
consideration in selecting the set of shared parameters. The results of applying the 
security model in three printers, was considerable. 
On the other hand, some papers focused on quantitative measures in order to evaluate the 
security and risk of information leakage after applying their proposed model. Zhang et al. 
(2011a) modeled the knowledge of inferrer and inferences for protected parameters. 
Based on this model, the probability distribution of protected parameters was defined and 
the risk of information leakage caused by inferences was calculated by quantitative 
method. One of the other risks of collaborative design is reverse engineering. Harston and 
Mattson (2010) used some measures and parameters in order to calculate the barrier and 
time to reverse engineering.  By numerical calculation of time and barrier, the original 
manufacture can measure the security in collaborative design. As time and barriers are 
maximized, the security will be higher in design process. 
In this thesis, we evaluate the risk of information leakage considering the FP-matrix by 
quantitative formulations based on two criteria: 1- size of modules in modular FP-matrix 
which is defined by the number of rows and columns involved in the modules 2- the 
number of entities (shaded boxes) exist in and between modules. These two formulations 




2.3. Modularization and information leakage 
In our life, there is a large amount of data. To manage these data and in order to deal with 
them, we need to classify or group these data as cluster or module. 
There are many definitions for clustering in different papers. Alex et al. (2009) defined 
clustering as a task whose goal is to determine a finite set of categories (clusters) to 
describe a dataset according to similarities among its objects. Most papers describe 
clusters as blocks, which patterns in the same blocks are most similar to each other while 
the patterns from different blocks are most different. Clustering can be used in many 
different areas, ranging from engineering, computer sciences, life and medical sciences, 
to earth sciences, social sciences and economics (Xu 2005). 
Defining similarity (or dissimilarity) measure is the first step in cluster analysis in order 
to depict the closeness of any two objects. In fact similarity (or dissimilarity) measure 
determines whether two objects are close enough to be put in the same cluster or not. 
Two typical similarity (or dissimilarity) measures are Euclidean distance and Jaccard 
coefficient Li (2007). 
Clustering techniques can be classified into three main types (Alex et al. 2009): 1-
hirerechical clustering, 2- partitional clustering and 3- overlapping clustering.  
Hierarchical clustering methods divide or merge existing groups to build hierarchical 
agglomerative or divisive structure respectively.  
One of the most common applications of clustering is in grouping the elements of design 
structure matrix. A DSM is a matrix represents the dependency and information flow (in-
to) between two elements or variables in a complex system from one type. As much as 
the dependency value is lager, the dependency between two elements is higher. There are 
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various methods in literature for calculating pair wise dependencies and constructing 
DSM (Nikanjam et al. 2010). In fact each row of the DSM represents the need of 
information supported by each column element for that element and each column 
represents that this elements give information to which elements of each row.  
Compared to DSM, rectangular matrix (RM) represents the dependency of two different 
types of elements. For example according to Li (2007), RM can be a matrix which its 
columns are labeled by parts and its rows are labeled by machines. So the RM matrix 
indicates how these machines and parts related to each other. Since DSM and RM are 
methods that can represent the design problems, we focus on the history of these methods 
and review the clustering methods that lead in modularization in DSM or RM format with 
the concern of information protection.  
According to Nikanjam et al. (2010), the main objective of DSM clustering is to find 
clusters that are basically the subsets of DSM elements or tasks such the elements or 
tasks inside a cluster have maximum relation and interacting and elements or tasks of 
different clusters have minimum relation and interacting. DSM clustering methods are 
applicable in architectural improvement in organizations and product design and 
development (Yu et al. 2009) 
Different DSM clustering methods exist in literature to extract clusters from design 
structure matrix. Some researchers used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to 
represent interdependency between elements or tasks for clustering. Chen et al. (2007) 
proposed an approach based on numerical coupling strengths and used similarity 
coefficient methods which are more suitable for numerical coupling based on their 
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opinion. After constructing the DSM, the authors used a robust approach, average linkage 
method, to cluster the elements with the lowest distance measure first.  
Li (2007) proposed a DSM clustering method that is suitable for all DSM structures and 
RM. In his approach, he used hierarchical clustering algorithm (single linkage) as 
clustering method.  
Another method was introduced by Fernandez (1998). He tried to find a good DSM 
clustering arrangements using simulated annealing search technique. According to Yu et 
al. (2007), ―a clustering arrangement is considered to be ―good‖ if only few (or none) 
interactions are left out and clusters are dense.‖At first step he considered each element 
as an individual cluster and evaluates the bids from other clusters, if there are any better 
bids from other clusters. But Yu et al. (2009) claim that this algorithm has simple 
objective function which is trade-off between the cost of being inside a module and the 
overall system benefit and is not suitable for more complex system or products. They also 
claim that this algorithm with many other suggested techniques such as GAs to form 
product modules based on Fernandez‘s (1998) approach, suffers from problems like 
oversimplified objective function and restricting parameters like maximum number of 
clusters. So they introduced another DSM clustering method called DSMGA to solve 
these problems. In DSMGA technique, the authors more focus on clustering metrics. 
Because they believed many problems are originally because of insufficient metrics for 
arranging good clustering. For this reason, Yu et al. (2009) proposed clustering metric 
based on the minimum description length principle and converted the DSM clustering 
problem to an optimization problem. The authors then used GAs to solve this 
optimization problem. This method acts well especially for overlapping modules. Some 
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other methods were proposed for removing the overlapping parts of modules to yield the 
independent blocks such as an extended CI method.  
Some researchers used clustering and modularity concept in order to control the security 
of information. Rojas-Arciniegas and Kim (2012) proposed the matrix-based approach 
that considers information security in determining optimal product architecture and 
component sharing decisions. Then they used modularization in order to separate the 
sensitive information. Recently, Deng et al. (2012) applied clustering method to 
decompose the components of the product and allocate them to different suppliers 
regarding IP protection issues in order to mitigate the risk of information leakage.  
While their work and this thesis both use the matrix models and the modularity concept, 
the work of this thesis is different.  Firstly, the notion of inferences is not explicitly 
discussed in Rojas-Arciniegas and Kim (2012).  Their security information is defined by 
identifying the critical functions (as the user input) and mapping them directly to a set of 
restricted components (i.e., resulting in the security matrix). Secondly, Rojas-Arciniegas 
and Kim (2012) and Deng et al. (2012), both perform DSM clustering, and this thesis 
applies hierarchical clustering for RM clustering. Finally, Deng et al. (2012) applies a 
matrix based method to decompose the product considering different types of interactions 
in order to allocate the components to the selected suppliers while mitigating the risk of 
information leakage. In this paper they focus on optimal supplier selection in order to 
mitigate the risk of information leakage. However, in our thesis, we focus on the 
selection of secured parameters for sharing and collecting all protected parameters in 
separated modules. We consider that these works propose different scopes and aspects in 
addressing the emerging security issues in product design. 
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The clustering method of this thesis is based on the framework by Li (2007), and the new 
element is the use of the target coefficient (to be discussed in Chapter 4), which promotes 




















Chapter 3: Matrix-based Modeling for Secure Parametric Design 
3.1. Function-parameter matrix 
Mun et al. (2009) divided the design process to three phases:  functional design, 
conceptual design, and detail design. According to the example in Chapter 6, in the 
functional design phase of one DC motor, the factors and requirements that satisfy the 
customers‘ needs are defined. In the conceptual design phase, a set of components of DC 
motor with their behavioral properties are selected which are well-known as design 
parameters in parametric design and their relationships between these parameters are 
specified by design functions. In the detail design phase, all design and geometric 
constraints with detailed geometry of parameters, according to the engineering design 
context of DC motor, are considered. 
Consider one design problem with n design parameter and m design function. According 
to Li (2007), rectangular matrix (RM) represents the dependency of two different types of 
elements. As design functions and design parameters are two different types of entities, 
we use RM matrix in order to illustrate the dependency of these two types of entities. In 
this thesis, we call this RM matrix as FP matrix witch its rows represents the design 
functions (symbolized fi)  and its columns represent design parameters (symbolized pi). 
Each element of this FP matrix can be symbolized as mij which means the element from 
i
th
 row and j
th
 column. The value of mij can be either 0 or 1. mij equals zero means there is 
no direct dependency between i
th
 design function and j
th
 design parameter. However, 
there is possibility of being indirect dependency via inferences which will be discussed in 





 design function and j
th
 design parameter. We represent this FP dependency matrix by 
M, which  
M = [mij], (i = 1, 2, …, m; j = 1, 2, …, n)  
In order to clarify the application of this FP matrix in this step, we choose one small part 
of FP matrix related to design of DC motor from Chapter 6 as below: 
 
Figure ‎3-1: A sample FP matrix of DC motor 
As shown in Figure 3-1, the FP matrix, M, has three design functions (i.e. f8, f9, f16). 
There are also four design parameters that are labeled with numbers. In this matrix, p21, 
p19, p8, and p7 correspond to design voltage, number of slots or teeth on rotor, depth of 
slots, and rotor diameter in DC motor, respectively. The complete list of these parameters 
with their description will be found in Appendix B. The shaded cells of this matrix 
represent the dependency between related functions and parameters (i.e. mij=1) and the 
non-shaded cells remark that there is no dependency between the related functions and 
parameters (i.e. mij=0). These dependencies have been concluded from the constraints 
and physical equations of DC motor design. 
3.2. Characterization for secure collaboration 
In this thesis, we deal with two different types of entities. The entities that contain 
information which are important for the original manufacturer to be protected and the 
entities which their information are vital to be shared with the other parties 
(manufacturers and suppliers) in order to be able to design their own part correctly and 
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effectively. With reference to Zhang et al (2011a), we categorize these different types of 
entities for secure collaboration as follows: 
1- Protected parameters: In collaborative design, they include the entities 
(parameters) which their information must be kept protected from other parties in 
order to protect the competitive advantages points of OM. In fact, these 
parameters are IP-sensitive parameters of the original manufacturer. 
2- Protected functions: In collaborative design, they include the entities (functions) 
which contain the protected parameters and the critical information can be derived 
via these functions. 
3- Shared parameters: These types of entities include parameters that need to be 
shared with the other parties (manufacturers and suppliers) in order to make the 
collaborative design process more effective. 
In this thesis, IP-sensitive parameters, which need to be kept more secured, are identified 
by the original manufacturer. As the protected parameters are specified, the functions 
which contain the protected parameters are labeled as protected functions. The IP-
sensitive parameters can be disclosed via these functions.  
In order to specify the shared parameters, we use some methods in order to minimize the 
risk of disclosing the protected parameters that it can happen by controlling the 
inferences. These methods, as the main contribution of this thesis, are introduced in 
Chapter 4 with more details. 
In order to discriminate different kinds of parameters and functions and for better visuals, 
for all FP matrices, we specify the protected parameters and functions with highlighted 
cells and we specify shared parameters with bolded and italic cells. Consider FP matrix in 
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Figure 3-1, p8 is considered as a protected parameter. As f16 contains p8, we label f16 as a 
protected function. As we can see in this example, p7 is a shared parameter. Since f16 
contains p8 and p7 as well, the possibility of disclosure of p8 via f16 is maximized. Due to 
existence of these types of inferences, we need to control the selection of shared 
parameters in order to minimize the risk of disclosure of IP-sensitive parameters. In order 
to achieve this goal, we use modularization method which is the new element as 
compared to the work of Zhang et al. (2011a).   
3.3. Utility of modular matrix 
 By increasing the number of design parameters in collaborative design, controlling the 
distribution of protected parameters and inferences in FP matrix will be more 
complicated. In this case, in order to overcome the complex dependency between 
parameters, we apply modularization method introduced by Li (2007). In this method, the 
parameters which are related to the specific structure of the whole design try to be put 
close to each other in the same module. For example, the parameters of Rotor in design of 
one DC motor try to be gathered in the same module. It can happen by re-arranging the 
columns and the rows of the original FP matrix. In the next section, we describe the steps 
that this modularization can take place. 
For better understanding, consider FP matrix in Figure 3-2 b. In the FP matrix, all 
modules are aligned along the diagonal and each module contains the subset of functions 
and parameters which are highly related to each other. For instance, Module 2 contains 
p6, p33, p17, p3, p5 and f12, f11, f13, which have high dependency. Besides these modules, we 
can see some non zero entities which represent the dependency between modules. In this 
thesis, we call these entities as interactions or inferences. The combination of all modules 
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and interactions covers the whole functions and parameters. By modularization, we can 
isolate the parameters which are as IP-sensitive of the company in one or few modules 
which we call them protected module(s). By this method, we can keep the information of 
these module(s) more secure. However, there are always some interactions between the 
protected and non-protected module(s) which can lead to disclosure of protected 
parameters. For instance, if we set p22 as protected parameter, Module 1 is labeled as 
protected module. Now, if we share some parameters from Module 2, such as p17, the 
parameters of Module 1 can be disclosed via f9 and f18 which are the interaction entities. 
So, it can show how much the tracking and controlling the interactions and selecting the 
appropriate set of parameters for sharing is important in secure collaborative design. In 
this thesis, the formation of a modular matrix is achieved by using the clustering method, 




























Figure ‎3-2: Matrix-based modularization process 
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Chapter 4: Matrix-based Clustering Method for Modularization 
Alex et al. (2009) defines clustering as a task whose goal is to determine a finite set of 
categories (clusters) to describe a dataset according to similarities among its objects. 
Clustering can be used in many different areas, ranging from engineering, computer 
sciences, life and medical sciences, to earth sciences, social sciences and economics (Xu 
2005). In this thesis, we apply clustering method in order to generate modules which 
include design parameters and functions and in order to analyze the dependency of 
parameters within and between modules. For this reason, we use the clustering method 
which its steps are conformed to the steps of hierarchical clustering, particularly, the 
agglomerative (i.e., bottom-up) procedure. 
4.1. Fundamental of hierarchical clustering 
In an agglomerative hierarchical clustering method, there is no single step for partitioning 
of data to particular number of clusters and groups, instead in this method, some 
sequential partitioning take place which starts form one cluster containing all individual 
entities. 
The general algorithm for hierarchical clustering is as below (Li 2007): 
Step 1: Measure the similarity/dependency value between any two entities.  
Step 2: Select the entities that illustrate the highest dependency value. Group them in one 
cluster and consider them a grouped entity.  
Step 3: Update the dependency values considering the newly joint entity.  
Step 4: Check if all the entities are clustered stop the procedure. Otherwise, go to Step 2. 
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The output of this clustering will be a tree which its branches are constructed from the 
merged entities in each phase. This tree represents how entities should be clusters 
progressively. For better visuals, we set a small example with six entities (a,b,c,d,e,f). 
The similarity/dependency matrix of these entities is shown in Table 4-1. 
According to first step of hierarchical clustering method, we pick the entities with the 
highest similarity value. In this figure, ‗d‘ and ‗e‘ have the highest dependency equals to 
0.93. We pick these two entities and group them as one entity (de). So, ‗de‘ entity is the 
first branch of the tree structure. Then, we go to step 2 and update all the similarity 
values. The similarity values for ‗de ‘are calculated by averaging the values related to 
entities‗d‘ and ‗e‘. The same procedure can be applied to the updated similarity matrix 
until it cannot be further reduced. The final tree with its all branches is shown in Figure 
4-1. 
 a b c d e f 
a 1 0.76 0.25 0.14 0.32 0.09 
b 0.76 1 0.24 0.87 0.43 0.11 
c 0.25 0.24 1 0.55 0.27 0.81 
d 0.14 0.87 0.55 1 0.93 0.12 
e 0.32 0.43 0.27 0.93 1 0.62 
f 0.09 0.11 0.81 0.12 0.62 1 




 a b c f de 
a 1 0.76 0.25 0.09 0.23 
b 0.76 1 0.24 0.11 0.65 
c 0.25 0.24 1 0.81 0.41 
f 0.09 0.11 0.81 1 0.37 
de 0.23 0.65 0.41 0.37 1 









Figure ‎4-1: The tree structure of hierarchical clustering 
 
By constructing the tree structure of our example, we can drive different clusters based 
on the desired number of clusters. For instance, if the desired number of clusters is three, 
the output clusters will be {de},{cf} and {ab}. But if the desired number of cluster is just 











c f a b 
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This tree structure helps the grouping of entities in order to make the final clusters, but to 
finalize theses clusters, further information will be provided in the following chapters.  
4.2. Three-phase matrix clustering framework 
In this section, we introduce and develop the clustering phases defined by Li (2007) 
which correspond to the phases of hierarchical clustering method. These three phases are 
described briefly as follows: 
1- Coupling analysis: represents the dependency information between any two 
design entities considering the similarity/dissimilarity index. Using this 
information, we can decide about putting the two entities in one module or 
separate one. 
2- Sorting analysis: bring the entities with high coupling index, close to each other 
and sequence all design entities based on their coupling values. The 
diagonal/sorted matrix is as the result of this phase. 
3- Partitioning: partition the sorted matrix and group the entities and identify the 
interactions between the groups based on various criteria such as intended size of 
modules, number of modules, and maximum number of interactions. 
In the next section, we will describe each phase considering their application for 
clustering the FP matrix in collaborative design. 
4.2.1. Coupling analysis 
Secure sharing of information in collaborative design has the most priority for all 
participating parties. For this reason, the likelihood of information leakage of one design 
entity via the other design entities due to the existence of dependency between them is a 













big deal for companies. Considering the FP matrix introduced in Chapter 3, this 
information leakage can be defined as the disclosure of some parameters information via 





For better understanding about the coupling concept in FP matrix, consider the FP matrix 
in Figure 4-2 which represents 10 functions and 12 parameters. Without using any 
specific formulation, we can say that p1 and p2 are coupled and the information of p1 can 
be leaked via f7 (vice versa). However, the coupling degree is different between various 
entities. In order to normalize and formulate different coupling degree between entities, 
we count the number of functions that affect each two entities. In this example, we count 
the number of functions that contain p1 and p2. Using the notation of FP matrix 
formulated in (1), the coupling between two parameters pi and pj, can be calculated using 






















      (2) 
 
Figure ‎4-2: A sample FP matrix for relief valve 













In the above formulation, the min operator counts the number of functions that contain 
both considered parameters and max operator counts the number of functions that contain 
each of the considered parameters. We can also use the same formulation for calculating 





















      (3) 
In this thesis, we also need to calculate the coupling value between parameters and 
functions which are from two different types. In this context, we use the two-mode 





















    (4) 
When fi and pj are only related to each other not the other entities, the value of above 
formulation will be 1. In this case, these two entities will be definitely grouped in the 
same cluster. In contrast, if fi and pj are also related to the other entities, the chance of 
being in the same cluster will be lower. This situation is captured in the denominator of 
Formulation (4). 
The point in these formulation is that the coupling values between the same type of 
entities and different type of entities are bounded between zero (i.e., no coupling) and one 
(i.e., two entities must be grouped in the same block).   
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Accordingly, three matrices denoted as CMr, CMc, and CMrc are the outputs of each type 
of formulation respectively (i.e. pi and pj, fi and fj, pi and fj ). In order to make one unit 
symmetric matrix denoted as CM, we combine three coupling matrices CMr(n×n), 
















CM       (5) 
where wc, wr and wrc are the weights for three coupling matrices.  This combined CM is a 
square and symmetric matrix that records the coupling values between any two design 
entities, and a design entity can be either a design function or a design parameter.  Since 
the coupling values in (5) are determined via two different coefficients (i.e., the min/max 
and two-mode coefficients), the weights in (5) are intended to minimize any bias from 
these coefficients.  Thus, it is required that the average of the coupling values determined 
by the min/max coefficient be roughly equal to the average of the coupling values 









































     (6) 
In order to increase the chance of protected parameters and functions being grouped in 
the same modules and keeping the related parameters and functions close to each other, 
we introduce one concept as target coefficient. In modularization, target coefficient 
makes the protected parameters and their related parameters and functions more highlight 
by affecting the coupling values, hence, the protected parameters and all their 
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dependencies can be grouped in the same modules in order to mitigate the risk of 
information leakage. The target coefficients are considered in three different situations 
between entities from the same and different types. These situations are classified as 
below: 
 Two entities are protected.  In this situation, we apply weights for the coupling values 
in order to increase the chance of being grouped together.  
 One entity is protected, and another one is non-protected.  In this situation, we still 
apply weights for the coupling values in order to increase the chance of being 
grouped together. Yet, the scale of increase should not be greater than that of the 
previous situation. 
 Two entities are non-protected.  In this situation, the coupling value remains 
unchanged. 
Denote R(ei, ej) the coupling value between the ith and jth entities, and the entity can be 
either a design function or a design parameter.  Then, the target coefficient (denoted as 









entities protected-non are ,both  if,
entity protected a is , of oneonly  if,













eeR  (7) 
where ttw and tnw are the weights to increase the coupling values for the above first and 
second situations, respectively.  The values of ttw and tnw are between 0 and 1. If the 
values of ttw and tnw are smaller, the weighting effects are stronger (i.e., higher increase 
on coupling values).  For better understanding, we apply the target coefficient for the 
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sample FP matrix in Figure 4-2. In this example, we consider ttw = 0.1 and tnw = 0.3. As 
we can see in the following matrices, the coupling values for the target entities (protected 
parameters and functions) are relatively higher. 
Applying target coefficient as a tool for helping to group the protected entities in the 





a) Row coupling matrix (CMr) 
 





c) Row-column coupling matrix (CMrc) 
Figure ‎4-3: Coupling matrices of the sample matrix after applying the target coefficient 
 
 
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12
p1 - 0.25 0.33 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0
p2 0.25 - 0 0.66 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.2 0 0
p3 0.33 0 - 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p4 0 0.66 0 - 0 0 0.72 0 0 0 0.72 0
p5 0.33 0.25 0.33 0 - 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0
p6 0 0.25 0 0 0 - 0.33 0 0 0 0.33 0
p7 0 0.25 0 0.72 0 0.33 - 0 0 0 0.33 0
p8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0.33 0.25 0 0.33
p9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 - 0.67 0 0.33
p10 0.25 0.2 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.67 - 0 0.25
p11 0 0 0 0.72 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 - 0
p12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.25 0 -
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10
f1 - 0 0 0.25 0 0.66 0.17 0.62 0 0
f2 0 - 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.33
f3 0 0 - 0 0.5 0 0.17 0 0.25 0
f4 0.25 0 0 - 0 0 0 0.66 0 0
f5 0 0 0.5 0 - 0 0.17 0 0.25 0
f6 0.66 0 0 0 0 - 0.62 0.87 0 0
f7 0.17 0.2 0.17 0 0.17 0.62 - 0 0 0.2
f8 0.62 0 0 0.66 0 0.87 0 - 0 0
f9 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0 - 0
f10 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 -
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12
f1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0 0
f2 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.33 0 0.4
f4 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
f5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4 0.33 0 0
f6 0 0.76 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f7 0.33 0.29 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0.29 0 0
f8 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0.76 0 0 0 0.76 0
f9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5
f10 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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4.2.2. Sorting analysis 
The goal of this step is to rearrange all rows and columns of coupling matrix based on 
their coupling strength resulted from previous step. We do this rearranging or sorting by 
bringing all the functions and parameters, which are highly coupled, close to each other. 
The sequence of entities in rows/columns is such that the chance of high coupled entities 
is more to be closed together. As mentioned above, we apply hierarchical clustering 
method in order to do sorting analysis. The detailed description of sorting analysis steps 
with its application for sample FP matrix will be found in Appendix A.  
4.2.3. Partitioning analysis 
Considering the diagonal matrix in the previous section, partitioning analysis identifies 
the points that the clusters and modules can be formed. These partition points are 
specified using the tree from previous section and based on some criteria (such as size of 
module and number of modules). In case of having a large size matrix, this tree can 
facilitate finding good partition points. More algorithmic details of the tree-based 
approach can be found in Li (2011) and Appendix A. 
To mitigate the risk of information leakage in collaborative design, we use this three 
phase clustering method in order to separate the protected parameters and functions in 
one or few modules. These modules which contain protected parameters are labeled as 
protected modules and their information will be kept secure. However, the information of 
the other modules will be shared with the other parties. Then, we use this modular matrix 
and propose the risk formulation in the next chapter in order to estimate the risk of 
sharing the information and mitigate it as much as possible.  
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Chapter 5: Estimation of Information Leakage 
In order to formulate the estimation of information leakage risk, we first examine the 
distribution of shared and protected entities, respectively, in the modular FP matrix. In 
this dissertation, we propose two different types of information leakage risk formulation 
considering two factors: 1- size of modules in modular FP-matrix which is defined by the 
number of rows and columns involved in the modules, 2- the number of entities (shaded 
boxes) exist in and between modules. Then we briefly compare these two types of 
formulation. In fact, in this chapter, we define size of modules in two aspects. 
In view of the distribution of shared parameters, any module that contains shared 
parameters is labeled with ―S‖ (i.e., symbolize the meaning of ―shared‖).  To illustrate, 
suppose that the sample modular FP matrix in Figure 5-1 has p10, f22, f25, f1 as protected 
entities and p26 as a shared parameter.  Then, the corresponding module (i.e., Module 3) 
is termed ―S-labeled‖.  In this context, the suppliers are able to know the information of 
parameters pertaining to the S-labeled module (i.e., p12, p17, p26 and p20 in Module 3) due 
to common functions.  Then, we want to examine how the S-labeled modules interact 
with other modules.  By definition, any module that is directly related to S-labeled 
module(s) via interactions in the modular FP matrix is described as S-related.  In Figure 
5-1, since p12 in the S-labeled module is related to f22 and f25of Module 2 and f2 of Module 
1, Module 2 and Module 1 are identified as S-related.  In sum, Module 3 is S-labeled, and 











In view of the distribution of protected entities, any module that contains protected 
parameters is labeled with ―P‖ (i.e., symbolize the meaning of ―protected‖).  To illustrate, 
suppose that P10 is a protected parameter in Figure 5-1.  Then, the corresponding module 
(i.e., Module 2) is P-labeled.  In this context, the original manufacturers intend to protect 
the information of the parameters in the P-labeled module.  Then, we want to examine 
how the P-labeled modules are related to other modules.  By definition, any module that 
is directly related to P-labeled module(s) via interactions in the modular FP matrix is 
described as P-related.  In Figure 5-1, since P14 in the P-labeled module is related to f22 of 
Module 3 and   f2 ,  f23 of Module 1 , Module 1 and Module 3 are identified as P-related.  In 
sum, Module 2 is P-labeled, and Module 1 and Module 3 are P-related in Figure 5-1. 
5.1. Formulation type 1 
In order to estimate the risk of information leakage, this type of formulation focuses on 
size of modules in modular FP-matrix. The size of a module is defined as the product of 
the number of its functions (rows) and the number of its parameters (columns).  For 
Figure ‎5-1: Modular FP matrix  
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example, the size of Module 1 in Figure 5-1 is 3 (functions) multiplied with 2 
(parameters), which is equal to 6. 
In this type of formulation, we consider the modules which contain elements related to 
shared and protected parameters simultaneously. So we need to check the modules that 
are overlapped with ―P‖ and ―S‖ elements to identify the potential of information 
leakage.  For instance, Module 2 in Figure 5-1 is both P-related and S-related, and 
information leakage may take place via this module.  Particularly, we denote the sizes of 
four types of overlapping modules as follows: 
 ALL = the total size of modules that are P-labeled and S-labeled 
 ALR = the total size of modules that are P-labeled and S-related 
 ARL = the total size of modules that are P-related and S-labeled 
 ARR = the total size of modules that are P-related and S-related 
 
In these four types of overlapping modules, ALL represents the highest risk of information 
leakage since both protected and shared entities are contained in the same modules.  
Comparatively, ARR represents the least risk due to indirect information leakage via 
interactions.  Then, ALR and ARL represent the leakage risk between ARR and ALL.  
Accordingly, different weighting factors are applied to these terms to capture this 
reasoning.  To normalize the measure of information leakage, we further define Ap_label as 
the total size of P-labeled modules and Ap_relate as the total size of P-related modules.  














       (9) 
where w1, w2 , w3, and w4 are the weighting factors (between 0 and 1) to capture the 
effects of information leakage from P-related and S-related modules.  In this formulation, 
the value of w3 should be smaller than the values of w1 and w2 due to the absence of the 
direct effects from P-labeled or S-labeled modules (i.e., w3 ≤ w1 and w3 ≤ w2).  In 
addition, since w4 represents the effect of P-related modules, its value should be between 
the values of w2 and w3 (i.e., w3 ≤ w4 ≤ w2).  In this thesis, we set w1 = w2 = w4 = 0.5 and 
w3 = 0.3. 
5.1.1. Demonstration 
By considering P10 as protected parameter in Figure 5-2, we assume three different shared 
parameters in each module to represent three different cases of information leakage. 
Since P10 appears in Module 2, we label this module as P-labeled Module, and as 
mentioned before, due to the interaction entities between Module 2 and Modules 1&3, we 










Figure ‎5-2: A sample FP matrix with three cases 
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In Case 1, we set P23 as a shared parameter which makes Module 1 as S-labeled and 
Modules 2&3 as S-related.  In Case 2, we set P25 as a shared parameter which makes 
Module 2 as S-labeled and Modules 1&3 as S-related.  In Case 3, we set P26 as a shared 
parameter which makes Module 3 as S-labeled and Modules 1&2 as S-related.  Tables 5-
1 and 5-2 have summarized the details of the case setup. 
In the qualitative comparison, Case 2 should present the highest risk of information 
leakage because both protected and shared parameters appear in the same module. To 
estimate the risk of information leakage, at first step we calculate the size of modules by 
multiplying the number of parameters and functions in each module as follows: 
Size of Module 1: 3*2= 6 
Size of Module 2: 4*9= 36 
Size of Module 3: 5*4 =20 
We explain the estimation of information leakage risk for case 1 to clarify the suggested 
formulation.  As Module 2 is P-labeled and Modules 1&3 are P-related in all cases, 
Ap_label = Size of Module 2= 36 and Ap_relate = Size of Module 1 plus Size of Module 3= 
6+20 = 26. 
In case 1, since P-labeled and S-labeled Modules are different, ALL =0. The overlapping 
module (i.e. Module 2), makes ALR = 36. On the other hand, Module 1 is another 
overlapping module leading to ARL = 6. Finally, ARR = 20, because the only overlapping 
module, is Module 3 which is S-related and P-related.  By taking the weighting factors, 
the risk estimation in Case 1 is equal to: 
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Case 1: (0+(0.5*36)+(0.5*6)+(0.3*20))/(36+26) = 0.43 
Case 2: (36+(0.5*0)+(0.5*0)+(0.3*(20+6)))/(36+26) = 0.70 
Case 3: (0+(0.5*36)+(0.5*20)+(0.3*6))/(36+26) = 0.48 
Table 5-1 has shown the resulting estimates of the information leakage for three cases.  
We can see that Case 2 yields the highest risk of information leakage and Cases 1&3 the 
medium risk which proves the above claim. 
 Protected 
Parameter 
P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P23 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
0.43 
Case 2 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P25 Module 2 Modules  
1&3 
0.70 
Case 3 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P26 Module 3 Modules 
1&2 
0.48 
Table ‎5-1: Case setup for demonstrating the risk estimation of information leakage (Formulation 
type 1) 
 
5.2. Formulation type 2 
Since formulation type1 is based on the size of modules while the number of interactions 
between modules, especially between protected module and shared modules, has no 
effect on the result of this formulation, we introduce the other type of formulation. In fact 
Formulation type 2 represents the effect of intensity of interactions between modules 
which are one of the most important reasons in information leakage. In order to make the 
Formulation type 2, we consider the number of dependency entities (shaded boxes) as the 
basis for information leakage risk estimation. Since the size of modules and interactions 
between modules affect the information leakage, we examine the size of modules that are 
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overlapped with shared and protected entities and the number of interaction parameters 
between the non-overlapped modules to estimate the risk of information leakage. 
The quantification of the risk of information leakage is based on the proportion of P-
labeled and P-related modules associated with shared parameters (in terms of S-labeled 
and S-related modules) and the interactions between modules.  First of all, the size of a 
module is defined as follow: 





         𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝑗𝑘  = {0 or 1}                                                           (10) 
Where 𝑀𝑘  is the total size of k
th
 module, 𝑖𝑘 = 1 is the first row of the module K and 𝑛𝑘  is 
the last row included in module K, 𝑗𝑘 = 1 is the first column of Module K and 𝑚𝑘  is the 
last column included in module k, 𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝑗𝑘  is the ij
th
 entity of module k, which can be zero or 
one. In fact the size of each module is the number of entities that represent the 
dependency in the module (shaded entities in Figure 5-2). For example, the size of 
Module 1 in Figure 5-2 is 6, which means 6 non-zero dependencies exist in Module 1.  
Secondly, we need to check the modules that are overlapped with ―P‖ and ―S‖ elements 
to identify the potential risk of information leakage.  For instance, Module 2 in Figure 5-2 
is both P-related and S-related, and information leakage may take place via this module.  
Particularly, we denote the sizes of four types of overlapping modules as follows: 
 MLL = the total size of modules that are P-labeled and S-labeled 
 MLR = the total size of modules that are P-labeled and S-related 
 MRL = the total size of modules that are P-related and S-labeled 
 MRR = the total size of modules that are P-related and S-related 
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Finally, we need to define different types of non-overlapping modules in order to 
consider the interactions between them (For example in Figure 5-2, the number of 
interaction entities between Module 2 and Module 3 is 7) as follows: 
 PLSL = the total number of interaction entities between P-labeled and S-labeled 
Modules 
 PLSR = the total number of interaction entities between P-labeled and S-related 
Modules 
 PRSL = the total number of interaction entities between P-related and S-labeled 
Modules 
 PRSR = the total number of interaction entities between P-related and S-related 
Modules 
In order to formulate the risk of information leakage, we need to consider different risks, 
with different weights. Firstly, the risk of information leakage between P-labeled and S-
labeled modules represents the highest risk, because information leakage of this type, 
directly lead to the information leakage of protected parameters. Comparatively, the risk 
of information leakage between P-related and S-related Modules represents the least risk 
due to indirect information leakage via interactions.  Then, the risks of information 
leakage between P-labeled and S-related Modules and P-related and S-labeled Modules 
represent the leakage risk between two first types of risk. Accordingly, different 
weighting factors are applied to these terms to capture this reasoning.   
Considering these classifications, the number of interaction entities between the 
overlapped Modules with ―S‖ and ―P‖ is equal to size of the overlapped Modules. For 
example, in Figure 5-2, if we consider p23 as shared parameter, the number of interaction 
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entities between P-labeled Modules and S-related Modules is equal to the size of Module 
2 (Module 2 is the overlapped Module with P-labeled and S-related parameters) plus the 
interactions between Module 2 and Module 3. In fact, since the P-labeled and S-related 
parameters exist in the same module, all the dependency entities in Module 2 (i.e. size of 
Module 2) may lead to information leakage between P-labeled and S-related parameters. 
On the other hand, the other S-related module, i.e. Module 3 has some interaction with 
Module 2. So, the interaction between these two Modules can cause information leakage. 
Accordingly, the case which both protected and shared entities are contained in the same 
modules represents the highest risk of information leakage. In this case, there are no 
interaction entities between P-labeled and S-labeled, but all the entities in this module can 
directly lead to information leakage. 
 To normalize the measure of information leakage, we further define Mp_label as the total 
size of P-labeled modules plus the number of interaction entities related to P-labeled 
modules and Mp_relate as the total size of P-related modules plus the number of interaction 
entities related to P-related modules.  Accordingly, the measure of information leakage 
considering the size of overlapped modules and the number of interaction entities 
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where w1, w2 , w3, and w4 are the weighting factors (between 0 and 1) to capture the 
effects of information leakage from P-related and S-related modules.  In this formulation, 
the value of w3 should be smaller than the values of w1 and w2 due to the absence of the 
direct effects from P-labeled or S-labeled modules (i.e., w3 ≤ w1 and w3 ≤ w2).  In 
addition, since w4 represents the effect of P-related modules, its value should be between 
the values of w2 and w3 (i.e., w3 ≤ w4 ≤ w2).  In this dissertation, we set w1 = w2 = w4 = 0.7 
and w3 = 0.5. 
5.2.1. Demonstration 
The distribution of shared and protected parameters and the conditions of three cases are 
the same as the one we explained for Formulation type1. But this time, in order to 







Considering Figure 5-3, Module 2 is P-labeled and Modules 1&3 are P-related for all 
cases. The size of module 1, regarding the Formulation 10 is as follows: 





                     𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝑗𝑘= {0 or 1}                                                        






Since in Module 1, there are 6 shaded boxes, 𝑀1= 6. According to this explanation, 𝑀2= 
15 and 𝑀3= 10. As Module 2 is P-labeled and Modules 1&3 are P-related in all cases, 
Mp_label = Size of Module 2 plus the number of interaction related to Module 2 = 36+10= 
46 and Mp_relate = Size of Module 1 plus Size of Module 3 plus the number of interaction 
related to Modules 1&3= 6+20+11 = 37. 
We explain the way of estimating the risk of information leakage for Case 1, step by step. 
Firstly, we need to calculate the size of overlapping Modules in Case 1. Considering the 
different S-labeled and P-labeled in Case 1, MLL=0. Since Module 2 is P-labeled and S-
related, MLR=15 which is equal to size of Module 2. On the other hand, the overlapping 
Module 1which is S-labeled and P-related at the same time, makes MRL=6. Consequently, 
Module 3 as P-related and S-related module, makes MRR=10 which is equal to the size of 
Module 3. 
Secondly, we need to calculate the number of interaction between non-overlapping 
modules. Since in Case 1, Module 2 is P-labeled and Module 1 is S-labeled, PLSL =3 (the 
number of shaded boxes between Module 1 and Module 2).  As mentioned before, 
Modules 1&3 are P-related which make PRSL= 1, which means the number of interaction 
between Module 1and Module 3(non-overlapping modules). On the other hand, Modules 
2&3 as S-related modules, leading to PLSR= 7 (the number of shaded boxes between 
Module 2 and Module 3). Since Module 2&3 are S-related and Modules 1&3 are P-
related, we need to consider different situations in order to calculate PRSR: 1- the number 
of interactions between Modules 1&2, 2- the number of interaction between Modules 
2&3, 3- the number of interactions between Modules 1&3. According to these different 
situations, the total number of PRSR= 11. 
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By applying the weighting factors, the risk estimation in Case 1 is equal to: 
Case 1: L = 
3+0+0.7(7+15)+0.7(1+6)+0.5(11+10)
46+0.7(37)
 = 0.47 
Case 2: L = 
0+15+0.7(10+0)+0.7(10+0)+0.5(1+16)
46+0.7(37)
 = 0.52 
Case 3: L = 
7+0+0.7(3+15)+0.7(1+10)+0.5(11+6)
46+0.7(37)
 = 0.49 
Table 5-2 has shown the resulting estimates of the information leakage for three cases.  
We can see that Case 2 yields the highest risk of information leakage. But as we will 




P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P23 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
0.47 
Case 2 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P25 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
0.52 
Case 3 P10 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
P26 Module 3 Modules 
1&2 
0.49 
Table ‎5-2: Case setup for demonstrating the risk estimation of information leakage (Formulation 
type 2) 
 
5.3. Comparison between two types of Formulation: 
 Considering Formulation type 1, the estimation of information leakage risk is just based 
on the selected size of modules and the number of columns and rows which are included 
in these modules. That is, if we select different partition points and consequently, 
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different size of modules, the results of the estimation of information leakage risk will be 
different, regardless the number of interactions exists between these modules. In contrast, 
Formulation Type 2 focuses on two factors, the number of entities which are included in 
the modules and the number of interaction between the selected modules. 
As we can see in the results of estimation risk for Formulation type 2, Case 2 has the 
highest risk but comparatively, Case 3 has high risk which is too close to the risk of Case 
1 due to the large number of interaction between Module 3(S-labeled) and Module 2 (P-
labeled). It means, despite of having different P-labeled and S-labeled Modules, the large 
number of interaction between these two modules lead to the high risk of information 












Chapter 6: Application 
In this chapter, we will justify our claim about the effects of modularization considering 
inferences in secure collaborative design. The inquiries in this context are: 1- Can ―the 
grouping of target entities‖ minimize the chance of interferences that lead to information 
leakage? 2- Which parameters should be shared with the suppliers in order to minimize 
the risk of leaking the information of protected parameters? 3- Can the matrix-based 
metric appropriately estimate the leakage situations? 
In order to answer to the above inquiries, we consider two different case studies: 1- DC 
motor 2-relief valve. Firstly, we yield the FP-matrix for each case to show how 
information leakage takes place and then we investigate the effect of grouping parameters 
and functions in information leakage by using the clustering method introduced in 
Chapter 4.  Consequently, we set different cases for each case study by considering 
different set of shared parameters. In order to represent the effect of modularization 
considering inferences in secure collaborative design, we apply two types of formulations 
to estimate the risk of information leakage for each set of shared parameters. 
Finally we consider two different situations: 1- by assigning target coefficient as one of 
our contributions in the clustering method, 2- removing target coefficient concept and 
doing modularization without it. Then we compare the leakage situations by considering 
protected parameters as our target entities and estimate the leakage information for all 




6.1. DC motor 
A DC motor is one kind of electric motor which produces torque in order to turn the 
motor by using electricity and magnetic field. In fact, the torque is provided by different 
forces of magnets with two opposite polarity (i.e. repellent and attractive electromagnetic 
forces of the magnets) (Kim 2011). 
Since all the magnets are polarized with a positive and a negative side, the attraction 
between these two different poles and the repulsion of similar poles, convert the 
electricity to the motion. These properties cause motors turns. Besides the poles, one DC 
motor requires at least one electromagnet that is often located in the center of motor. This 
electromagnet is responsible to keep the motor running by changing the polarity. A 
schematic view of one simple DC motor is shown in Figure 6-1. 
In this dissertation, the DC motor design is considered based on the motor weight. The 
optimal design for DC motor is the one with lower weight. Considering the motor design 
factors which affect the motor weight, the manufacturer needs to share some information 
with suppliers and at the same time, protect some important information to prevent 
reverse engineering in producing low weight DC motor which is the competitive 
advantage point for companies. In order to design a low weight DC motor, we consider 
P8 (Depth of slots) and P10 (Height of field windings) as protected parameters which 
directly affect the weight of motor and investigate different information leakage 











Figure ‎6-1: Schematic view of one simple DC motor (Seale 2003)1 
 
In order to design this DC motor, 25 design functions are considered which affect the DC 
motor weight, and they involve 26 parameters. In this dissertation the optimal design for 
DC motor is the one with the lowest weight.   
The definitions of the DC motor parameters are given in the Appendix B.  Figure 6-2 
represents the FP matrix that captures the dependency between these functions 
(represented in rows) and parameters (represented in columns).  In this study, we want to 
protect the parameters which are directly related to motor weight, i.e. parameters P8 and 
P10.  Thus, these two parameters are identified as protected parameters.  These protected 
parameters are directly related to f1, f7, f12, f13, f16, f17, f22 and f25 that are then identified as 
protected functions.  For better visuals, the letters f and p are omitted in the labels of the 
FP matrix in Figure 6-2 and the labels of protected parameters and functions are shaded.  
In collaborative design, we need to disclose some parametric information to the suppliers.   
 
                                                             
















6.1.1. How information leakage takes place? 
Considering the dependency matrix in coupling analysis section, each non-zero 
dependency occurs in the matrix, may lead to information leakage. In order to protect the 
information of one parameter, we need to control the information of that parameter and 
all functions and parameters which have dependency with the mentioned parameter. For 
example, in FP-matrix of Figure 6-2, in order to protect the information of parameter P10 , 
we need to control  f17, f22 and f25 and all parameters that exist in these functions. Because, 
the information of P10 can leak via these functions and parameters. This kind of 
dependency between design parameters and functions (i.e. inferences) is the most 
important reason of information leakage. 
6.1.2. Leakage situation without grouping 
As mentioned before, p8 and p10 are protected parameters. By considering p3, p4, p7 and p5 
as the shared parameters, we can use the dependency path to track the information 
leakage situations for each protected parameters. For example, by considering p7 as the 
Figure ‎6-2: FP matrix of the DC motor highlighted with protected entities 
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starting point of this dependency path, we can easily reach the information of protected 
parameters p8 and p10 via f22. The notation p7  f22  P8, P10, is to represent such a 
dependency path for each of the protected parameters. The dependency paths for all cases 
are presented below: 
P7  f22  P8, P10  
P3  f25  P8, P10   
P4  f1  P8, P10 
P5  f20  P12  f1  P10,    P5  f7  P8     
Selecting the appropriate set of shared parameters from FP-matrix has an important role 
in controlling of information leakage. By considering different shared parameters, 
different risks of information leakage are yielded. For each selected shared parameters, 
we represented the dependency path as above. The lengths of the above dependency paths 
roughly correspond to probability of information leakage. The shorter path is the better 
option to be selected as shared parameter. But these dependency paths are not exact 
criteria to select the appropriate set of parameters which can be shared without increasing 
the risk of information leakage for protected parameters. On the other hand, defining the 
set of parameters that should be protected in order to decrease the information leakage 
risk of the main protected parameters is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, by 
increasing the number of parameters, considering different dependency paths for all 
parameters in order to specify the most secured parameters for sharing, will be 
impossible. Secondly, when we share some parameters, there are no criteria to compare 
the risks of information leakage of the paths with the same length. For example, by 
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considering P5 as a shared parameter, the information of P8 can leak via f7 but the 
information of p10 cannot be determined easily. So the decision for selecting the shared 
parameters cannot be made appropriately. In this case, the risk of information leakage for 
all protected parameters may not be considered simultaneously. To solve this problem, 
we need to share one group of parameters that cause less information leakage of protected 
parameters compared to the other group of parameters. This grouping helps us to avoid 
testing the risk of information leakage one by one, (the risk of information leakage for 
each protected parameters that occur by each share parameters). We can consider the total 
affect of shared parameters on the protected parameters by grouping them. As shown 
above, one shared parameter may cause leaking information of one protected parameter 
easily; on the other hand, it can act as a good shared parameter which has no effect on the 
information leakage of the other protected parameters (P5).  
 So selecting one set of shared parameters that are lower risk parameters for protected 
parameters, seems difficult. In order to solve this problem, in the context of parametric 
design, this thesis proposed a clustering method defined in Chapter 4 that can group and 
isolate the IP-sensitive parameters in few modules.  As the modules with IP-sensitive 
parameters indicate the core information for protection, the information inference can be 
deliberately managed by controlling the interactions among various modules.  
Furthermore, the modular structure is used to analyze the risk of information leakage if 




6.1.3. Leakage situation with grouping 
Clustering and grouping lead to the decomposition and allocation of product design 
parameters that have an important effect on controlling the risk of inferences and 
mitigating the risk of information leakage (Zhang, et al. 2011a). Grouping gives us the 
chance of selecting one set of shared parameters with minimum risk of information 
leakage of protected parameters by controlling the inferences (interactions). In the 
modularization process, the parameters that share more common functions tend to be 
grouped in the same module.  In such a way, the parameters of the same module can be 
easily derived from each other due to the common functions.  Thus, the preferable 
situation in secure collaboration is that the protected entities are grouped in one or few 
modules (denoted as protected modules).  Then, the protected modules can be isolated 
from other modules via the control of the interactions.  That is, if the shared parameters 
are only found in the non-protected modules, the parameters in the protected modules can 
be protected by controlling the relevant interactions. The three specific phases of 
grouping we used in this thesis are described briefly as follows. 
 Coupling analysis: the couplings between any two parameters, between any two 
functions and between a parameter and a function are computed using Formulations 
(2), (3) and (4), respectively.  Then, the target coefficients are applied using 
Formulation (7).  The resulting coupling values are recorded in a concatenated 
coupling matrix as the analysis output. 
 Sorting analysis: the concatenated coupling matrix is processed via the sorting 
algorithm discussed in Chapter 4.  After executing the algorithm, the rows and 
columns of the original matrix are re-ordered to bring the high-coupled entities close 
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to each other.  The diagonal matrix is obtained accordingly, and it is shown in Figure 
6-3. 
 Partitioning analysis: it is intended to construct three modules for the diagonal matrix.  
Based on the tree-based approach discussed in Chapter 4, two partition points are 
identified, and they are located in Figure 6-3.  With these partition points, the 
corresponding modular structure is shown in Figure 6-3 as the result of the three-
phase clustering method. 
 









By applying the target weighting factors, the modular structure in Figure 6-3 represents 
that the protected entities are grouped relatively close to each other.  Particularly, Module 
1 almost contains most of the protected entities except f7 which is contained in Module 3.  
By looking at this matrix and without using any formulation, we can suggest that the 
Figure ‎6-3: Modular structure of the DC motor FP matrix 
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parameters contained in Module 2 can be shared with suppliers if we control the 
interaction entities between modules. Because, as we can see, there are no protected 
entities in Module 2. To further examine the information leakage issue, and in order to 
verify the above suggestion, three cases are set up based on the choice of shared 
parameters in different modules, and they are discussed as follows. 
 Case 1: share p7 (Rotor diameter) that is contained in Module 1. 
 Case 2: share p3 (Cross sectional area of field wire) that is contained in Module 2. 
 Case 3: share p5 (Maximum flux density) that is contained in Module 3. 
 
In order to estimate the risk of information leakage related to these three cases, we use 
Formulation Types 1&2 as defined in chapter 5. Tables 6-1 and 6-2 have summarized the 
resulting estimates of the information leakage for three cases regarding both 
Formulations, respectively. 
 
   Protected 
Parameter 
P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 P8, P10  Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
P7 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
0.91 
Case 2 P8, P10 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
p3 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
0.59 
Case 3 P8, P10 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
p5 Module 3 Modules 
1&2 
0.55 
Table ‎6-1: Case setup for demonstrating the risk estimation of information leakage in DC motors 







P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 P8, P10  Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
P7 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
0.86 
Case 2 P8, P10 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
p3 Module 2 Modules 
1&3 
0.76 
Case 3 P8, P10 Module 1 Modules 
2&3 
p5 Module 3 Modules 
1&2 
0.76 
Table ‎6-2: Case setup for demonstrating the risk estimation of information leakage in DC motors 
(Formulation type 2) 
M1 = 42  ;  M2 = 30   ; M3 = 10    




 = 0.86 









 = 0.76 
Tables 6-1 and 6-2 have summarized the case setup with P/S-labeled and P/S-related 
modules, as well as the values of leakage estimates according to Formulations (9) & (11).  
As we can see, despite Module 2 contains no protected entities, it relatively represents 
medium risk of being shared with suppliers, due to the large amount of interactions 
between this Module and P-labeled Module (Module 1). Since most of the protected 
entities are contained in Module 1, the risk of information leakage risk should be lower 
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with the shared parameters located farther from Module 1.  On the other hand, Module 3, 
which is the furthest Module from the P-labeled module, contains one protected entity. 
These two different situations of Module 3, lead to the range of low to medium risk of 
information leakage when this Module contains the shared parameters. This is basically 
observed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2.  Particularly, as Case 1 shares the parameter that is 
directly related to the principal parameters of weight of DC motor (i.e. P7) in Module 1, 
this case leads to the highest risk estimate.  In contrast, Case 2 leads to medium risk of 
information leakage. Because, Module 2 contains the shared parameters close to the 
Module 1. On the other hand, Module 2 contains some parameters which affect the DC 
motor weight (as P3) which cause large number of interactions between this module and 
Module 1. Case 3 which contains the protected entity, has its shared parameters in the 
module far from Module 1. So it demonstrates the risk in the range of low to medium. 
This Case also shares the parameters that are quite unrelated to the principal parameters 
of weight of DC motor. As a result, we reject the above claim about sharing the 
parameters of Module 2. Then we suggest sharing the parameters of Module 3, with 
lower risk compared to the other cases.  
In order to verify the estimation of risk values in the example, we use the dependency 
path which was introduced earlier in this chapter.  The dependency paths for all cases are 
shown below: 
 Case 1: P7  f22  P8, P10  
 Case 2: P3  f25  P8, P10   
 Case 3: P5  f20  P12  f1  P10,    P5  f7  P8    
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The lengths of the above dependency paths roughly correspond to the ranking of the risk 
estimates in Tables 6-1and 6-2.  As we discussed before, Case 1 has the highest value of 
leakage estimate and Case 2 relatively represents high value of leakage estimate. 
Accordingly, the dependency paths for these two cases are shorter. For Case 3, the above 
tables represent the risk value in the range of low to medium. If we consider P10 As the 
protected parameter, the dependency path for this case is longer than the other cases and 
for P8the dependency path is shorter. The dependency paths for Case 3, corresponds to 
the risk of estimate in the range of low to medium. The proposed module-based leakage 
measures do not capture this level of fidelity, and further research is required for a more 
detailed measure.  Nevertheless, the module-based approach allows us to approximately 
identify which subsets of parameters can be potentially shared with suppliers, and it is the 
original contribution of this paper.  
6.1.5. Leakage situation with non-target grouping  
By applying three phases of clustering method in Chapter 4 and without applying target 
coefficient, we have the new modular structure matrix as Figure 6-4. Considering 
modular structure of Figure 6-4, the protected parameters exist in two different modules 
(Module 1 and Module 3) that are far from each other and the protected functions are 
distributed among all the modules. By keep tracking the parameters which are related to 
the weight of DC motor, we can see these parameters are included in all modules. For 
instance, Module 1 contains P3 (Cross sectional area of field wire), Module 2 contains P12 





Figure ‎6-4: Modular structure of the FP matrix without using target coefficient 
6.1.6. The effect of target grouping 
Comparing modular structure matrix in Figures 6-3 and 6-4, the tracking of information 
leakage in Figure 6-4 is not quite possible. Firstly, the protected entities are distributed 
among all modules. So, all modules are P-labeled or P-related and as mentioned above, 
all these modules contain parameters that have direct affect on weight of DC motor. 
Secondly, when there is no possibility to consider all protected parameters in the same 
module, selecting one set of shared parameter that impose the lower risk of information 
leakage for all protected parameters is quite difficult. In this situation, tracking the 
interaction of various modules and controlling the risk of information leakage seems 
more difficult. Comparatively, since the modular structure in Figure 6-3 can roughly 
group the protected entities, it is easier to identify and control the interactions around the 
protected entities to prevent Information leakage. 
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Conventionally, defining different protected parameters, lead to different forms of 
modular structure matrix. Regarding the idea of using target coefficient, each of these 
different modular structure matrix attempts to keep the protected parameters close to each 
other and make them group. However the design functions and parameters and the 
modular structure of a design is often considered stable according to its functional and 
physical decomposition and considering different protected parameters have no affect on 
them. The feature of forming different modular structures based on emerging protected 
parameters is relatively new in this field of research (Rojas-Arciniegas and Kim 2012). 
6.2. Relief valve 
The relief valve system is adapted from Kannapan and Marshek (1992), which schematic 
is shown in Figure 6-5.  To design this valve system, 29 functions concerning geometry 
and fluid properties are identified, and they involve 49 parameters.  The definitions of the 
relief valve parameters are given in the Appendix C.  Figure 6-6 shows the FP matrix that 
captures the dependency between these functions (represented in rows) and parameters 
(represented in columns).  In this study, we want to protect helical spring specifications 
that correspond to the parameters p23, p32 and p37.  Thus, these three parameters are 
identified as protected parameters.  These protected parameters are directly related to f15, 
f16, f21, f24, f25 and f28 that are then identified as protected functions.  For better visuals, the 
letters f and p are omitted in the labels of the FP matrix in Figure 6-6, and the labels of 
protected parameters and functions are shaded.  In collaborative design, we need to 
disclose some parametric information to the suppliers.  The inquiry in this context is 
which parameters should be shared with the suppliers in order to minimize the risk of 






Figure ‎6-6: FP matrix of the relief valve system highlighted with protected entities 
 
6.2.1. Demonstration 
The modular structure in Figure 6-7 shows that the protected entities are grouped 
relatively close to each other.  Particularly, Module 3 contains most of the protected 
entities except f25, which is contained in Module 2.  By properly controlling the 
interactions between modules, we can roughly suggest that the parameters contained in 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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13 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Helical spring 
Poppet valve stem Poppet valve 
Inlet Outlet 
Figure ‎6-5: schematic of a relief valve system 
62 
 
Modules 1 & 4 (about valve external geometry and poppet valve specifications) can be 
shared with suppliers.  To further examine the information leakage issue, four cases are 
set up based on the choice of shared parameters in different modules, and they are 
discussed as follows. 
 Case 1: share p9 (seal thickness) that is contained in Module 1. 
 Case 2: share p38 (clash allowance ratio) that is contained in Module 2. 
 Case 3: share p25 (helical spring wire diameter) that is contained in Module 3. 
 Case 4: share p42 (valve cylinder thickness) that is contained in Module 4. 
 
Figure ‎6-7: Modular structure of the relief valve FP matrix 
In order to estimate the risk of information leakage related to these four cases, we use 
Formulation Types 1&2 as defined in Chapter 5. Tables 6-3 and 6-4 have summarized the 
resulting estimates of the information leakage for four cases regarding both Formulations. 
 
 
29 14 9 19 41 1 47 16 4 7 22 35 11 28 33 17 21 36 3 5 44 38 24 13 26 34 6 23 2 18 10 27 32 25 15 20 30 37 8 12 31 46 42 49 39 43 48 40 45
8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
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Interaction related 





P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p9 Module 1 Modules 
2 & 4 
0.17 
Case 2 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p38 Module 2 Modules 
1 & 3 
0.59 
Case 3 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p25 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
0.89 
Case 4 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p42 Module 4 Modules 
1 & 3 
0.41 
Table ‎6-3: Case setup for leakage risk analysis demonstrating the risk estimation of information 




P-labeled P-related Shared 
Parameter 
S-labeled S-related Leakage 
Estimate 
Case 1 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p9 Module 1 Modules 
2 & 4 
0.35 
Case 2 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p38 Module 2 Modules 
1 & 3 
0.66 
Case 3 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p25 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
0.82 
Case 4 p23, p35, p37 Module 3 Modules 
2 & 4 
p42 Module 4 Modules 
1 & 3 
0.61 
Table ‎6-4: Case setup for demonstrating the risk estimation of information leakage in relief valve 
(Formulation type 2) 
 
M1 = 17  ;  M2 = 24   ; M3 = 34   ; M4 = 13 






















 = 0.61 
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 have summarized the case setup with P/S-labeled and P/S-related 
modules, as well as the values of leakage estimates according to Formulations (9) & (11).  
As most of the protected entities are contained in Module 3, the leakage risk should be 
lower with the shared parameters located farther from Module 3.  This is basically 
observed in Table 6-4.  Particularly, as Case 3 shares the parameter that is directed to the 
helical spring (i.e., p25) in Module 3, this case leads to the highest risk estimate.  In 
contrast, Cases 2 and 4 have their shared parameters in the modules right next to Module 
3, leading to the medium risk estimates.  Case 1 has demonstrated the lower risk as it 
shares the parameter that is quite unrelated to the helical spring. 
Notably, the proposed leakage risk estimate in Formulation (9) is based on the modular 
solution.  To verify the risk estimate values in the example, we use the dependency paths 
introduced earlier in this chapter to trace the functional dependency from a shared 
parameter to one of protected parameters without considering the modularity information. 
The dependency paths of all cases are presented below. 
65 
 
 Case 1: p9  f7  p14 f8  p21 f12  p6 f15  p23 
 Case 2: p38  f25  p32 
 Case 3: p25  f21  p32 
 Case 4: p42  f29  p46  f23  p25  f21  p32 
 
The lengths of the above dependency paths roughly correspond to the ranking of the risk 
estimates in Table 6-4.  For instance, Cases 2 and 3 have the higher values of leakage 
estimate, and their dependency paths are shorter than those of Cases 1 and 4.  Yet, the 
proposed module-based leakage measure is only an approximation, and some detailed 
distinction may not be captured.  For instance, sharing the parameter p38 in Case 2 
directly leads to the information of one protected parameter (i.e., p32) via the interaction 
at f25 and p32 (pointed in Figure 6-7).  This specific interaction causes the same length of 
dependency paths between Cases 2 and 3.  The proposed module-based leakage measures 
do not capture this level of fidelity, and further research is required for a more detailed 
measure.  Nevertheless, the module-based approach allows us to approximately identify 
which subsets of parameters can be potentially shared with suppliers, and it is the original 
contribution of this paper.  
6.2.2. Effects of target coefficient 
To examine the effect of the target coefficient, we re-run the three-phase clustering 
method without applying the target coefficient, and the corresponding modular structure 
is shown in Figure 6-8.  Compared with Figure 6-7, this modular structure has the 
protected entities scattered in different modules (i.e., Modules 1, 2 and 4).  In the context 
of sharing the parameters with suppliers, this modular structure implies not to share 
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parameters in Modules 1, 2 and 4.  While finding shared parameters in Module 3, the 
interactions with this module need to be carefully handled to prevent information 
leakage. 
Considerably, the modular structure in Figure 6-8 is not quite useful for handling the 
information leakage issue as compared to the modular structure in Figure 6-7 for two 
reasons.  Firstly, we tend to select the parameters from the modules that are not P-labeled 
and P-related.  However, the modular structure in Figure 6-8 does not have such a 
module, increasing the difficulty of selecting shared parameters.  Secondly, since the 
protected entities are scattered in Figure 6-8, it becomes more difficult to keep track of 
the interactions of various modules and control the risk of information leakage.  
Comparatively, since the modular structure in Figure 6-7 can roughly group the protected 
entities, it is easier to identify and control the interactions around the protected entities to 
prevent information leakage. 
Conventionally, the modular structure of a design is often considered stable according to 
its functional and physical decomposition.  The idea of using the target coefficient 
essentially implies that the modular structures can be varied according to the 
identification of protected parameters.  That is, if different protected parameters are 
defined, the resulting modular structure should be specifically formed in attempt to group 





Figure ‎6-8: Modular structure of the FP matrix without using target coefficient 
 
6.3. General discussions 
By applying the modularization method in obtained FP matrices from DC motor and 
relief valve system and based on two formulations regarding these FP matrices, we can 
summarize the results as follows. It is necessary to mention that, the results of two 
different case studies (i.e. Dc motor and relief valve system) are consistent with each 
other. 
 The effect of target coefficient: After using target coefficient in grouping the 
entities, all the protected parameters have been grouped in one module and close 
to each other in both cases. However, without using target coefficient concept, the 
protected entities can possibly be distributed among all modules. So, all modules 
are P-labeled or P-related. Consequently, when there is no possibility to consider 
all protected parameters in the same module, selecting one set of shared parameter 
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that impose the lower risk of information leakage for all protected parameters is 
quite difficult 
 Risk estimation based on two types of formulations: By considering the results of 
risk estimation for different cases and based on two formulations for both case 
studies, we can conclude that selecting the set of shared parameters from P-
labeled modules (i.e. modules which include protected parameters) yield the 
highest risk of information leakage for protected parameters. We can also claim 
that the risk of information leakage will be high when the selected shared 
parameters are from modules that have so many interactions with the p-labeled 
modules. Unlike two previous situations, selecting one set of shared parameters 
from modules which are far from the p-labeled modules and have the least 















Chapter 7: Conclusions  
7.1. Summary 
Collaborative design is one common practice for companies to reduce the cost and time 
of designing a product. However, this collaboration may result in leaking the IP-sensitive 
information of original manufacturer to the other parties in collaborative design. In order 
to mitigate the risk of information leakage due to the nature of collaborative design, some 
methods and approaches have been suggested. 
In this thesis, we focused on modularity concept and clustering in order to group and 
isolate the IP-sensitive information for their protection. So, we developed a matrix-based 
modularization method. However, there is always the risk of leaking the information of 
IP-sensitive parameters via the interaction parameters. This modularization helps the 
original manufactures to track leaking of protected elements via interactions. MATLAB 
codes have been utilized in this thesis order to implement the algorithm of 
modularization. 
In order to evaluate the risk of information leakage for protected information, caused by 
sharing different set of parameters, we introduced two formulations based on the size of 
modules and the intensity of interactions between and within the modules. By using these 
formulations, we can facilitate the selection of one set of secure parameters for sharing 
with the other parties in collaborative design. In order to justify the proposed model and 
formulations, we applied them for relief valve system and DC motor. As a result, this 
modularization led in isolating the protected parameters in one module. Moreover, it can 
be concluded that selecting the set of parameters for sharing from the modules which are 
far from the protected module and have the least interaction with the protected module 
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imposes the lowest risk for original manufacture.  All the results verify our research 
works in this thesis. 
7.2. Contributions 
While some researchers have focused on the information protection methods in 
collaborative design, only few of them have considered the modularity concept as a 
method for information security. Compared to previous works, the contribution of this 
thesis is in developing the modularization method for information protection considering 
the inferences, based on hierarchical clustering steps. In this process, using target 
coefficient concept as a tool for keeping the protected information close to each other in 
FP matrix was original. 
In order to evaluate the risk of information leakage, two new formulations based on two 
different criteria were introduced. The first formulation was based on the size of modules 
and the second one was produced in order to clarify the role of inferences between 
modules in information leakage. 
Since the selection of parameters for sharing in collaborative design can affect the risk of 
information leakage, so, another contribution of this thesis is in identifying the subsets of 
parameters based on the results of the risk of information leakage which can be 
potentially shared with suppliers in order to minimize the information leakage in 
collaborative design. 
7.3. Future works 
In future, the matrix-based modularization approach can be applied for optimizing 
supplier selection, different modules can be assigned to different suppliers, and also the 
optimal number of suppliers can be specified. 
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We can also further elaborate the risk estimation formulation by considering different 
types of interactions between different parameters.  
Moreover, in order to improve risk estimation formulation, in future, we can estimate the 
risk of sharing one set of parameter in leaking all protected parameters simultaneously. In 
other words, we can control the information leakage for all protected parameters, even 
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Sorting analysis steps and partitioning analysis 
 Step 1: Constructing the tree branches: Considering obtained coupling matrix, select 
two entities which yield highest value. Then label the leaves of the tree according to 
the selected entities. Form the branch of the tree by combining the leaves (or 
branches). The vertical axis of the tree is labeled with the coupling values. The leaves 
(or branches) are merged to form a new branch at their coupling value. 
 Step 2: Updating the coupling matrix:  Update the coupling matrix by considering the 
two selected entities as one unit branch and recalculate the new coupling values 









)(         
(8) 
where rik is the coupling value between the ith and kth entities, and the subscript ij 
refers to the newly combined branch. 
 Step 3: Iteration check. Repeat Step 1 and Step 2 until the coupling matrix cannot be 
further reduced. 
 
The output of sorting analysis step is the tree (or dendrogram). In our thesis, we use 
sorting analysis in order to rearrange the sequence of rows and columns in FP matrix.  
Figure 7-1 has shown the sorted/diagonal matrix of the sample matrix, and Figure 7-2 













In order to illustrate the partition points, consider the diagonal matrix and the tree in 
Figures 7-1 and 7-2. By looking at the branches of tree in Figure 7-2, we can see the first 
partition points can be reached by breaking the first branch between p10 and p3. By 
keeping breaking the other level of branches we reach the second partition points 
between f7 and p2 .Based on the required number of modules and the other criteria, we 
stop or keep breaking the other branches.  Similarly, the second top branch suggests 
another partition point.   

















Description of DC motor parameters 
Parameters Functions Description 
p1 a f1 Number of parallel paths  
p2 Awa,  f22, f25 Cross sectional area of armature 
wires  
p3 Awf F2, f23, f24, f25 Cross sectional area of field wires  
p4 ac f1, f3, f18, f19, f20, f21 Specific electrical loading 
p5 Bg f3, f7, f14, f125, f20, f21 Maximum flux density  
p6 bfc f2, f4, f23, f24 Depth of field coil 
p7 D f1, f6, f7, f8, f9, f10, f11, f12, 
f13, f16, f17, f20, f21, f22, f25 
Rotor diameter 
p8 ds f1, f7, f12, f13, f16, f17, f22, f25 Depth of slots  
p9 fcf f2 Copper space factor 
p10 hf f2, f5, f23, f24 Height of field windings 
p11 lf f2, f23, f24 Field current 
p12 L f1, f4, f5, f0, f11, f20, f21, f22, 
f25 
Rotor axial length 
p13 Lmtf f2, f4, f23, f24 Mean turn length of field coil 
p14 Lwa f1, f22, f25 Length of armature wire 
p15 Lwf f23, f24, f25 Length of filed wire 
p16 nd f1, f2, f20 Derivative controller gain 
p17 p f1, f2, f6, f10, f11, f22 Number of poles 
p18 Pmind f1, f20 Minimum required power 
p19 S f16 Number of slots or teeth on rotor  
p20 Tmin d f21 Minimum required torque 
p21 Vd f8, f9 Design voltage 
p22 ƞ f1 Motor efficiency 
p23 ρ f2, f23, f24 Resistivity 
p24 ρcu,  f25 Densities of copper 
p25 ρfe f25 Densities of iron 
p26 Ψ f4, f5, f20, f21 Pole arc to pole pitch ratio 
 





 List of parameters of the relief valve system 
Parameter Description Parameter Description 
p1 orifice diameter p26 allowable helical spring 
material stress 
p2 Wahl spring rate p27 number of helical spring coils 
p3 spring rate reduction ratio (for 
stability) 
p28 fluid specific gravity 
p4 pipeline cross-sectional area p29 cracking pressure 
p5 actual spring rate p30 mean helical spring diameter 
p6 total force on helical spring p31 valve hole diameter 
p7 valve hole size ratio p32 helical spring solid length 
p8 radial clearance between 
helical spring and enclosure 
p33 dynamic fluid force 
p9 seal thickness p34 helical spring factor of safety 
p10 shear modulus of spring 
material 
p35 pressure drop from valve inlet 
to outlet 
p11 fluid flow rate p36 helical spring installed length 
p12 helical spring outer diametral 
clearance ratio 
p37 outer diameter of spring 
enclosure 
p13 flow area variation ratio p38 clash allowance ratio 
p14 seal outer diameter p39 maximum fluid pressure in 
pipeline 
p15 radial clearance between 
helical spring and poppet stem 
p40 valve outer diameter 
p16 flow line diameter p41 equivalent orifice diameter 
p17 computed spring rate p42 valve cylinder thickness 
p18 helical spring index p43 allowable stress for pipe 
material 
p19 flow coefficient (head loss 
factor) 
p44 helical spring free length 
p20 helical spring inner diametral 
clearance ratio 
p45 pipe thickness 
p21 cracking force on helical 
spring 
p46 inner diameter of spring 
enclosure 
p22 orifice coefficient p47 valve configuration factor 
p23 helical spring maximum stress p48 corrosion resistance allowance 
for valve enclosure 
p24 maximum deflection of valve 
and spring due to fluid force 
p49 corrosion resistance allowance 
for poppet valve stem 
p25 helical spring wire diameter   
 
